Tag Archives: collision

Emergency Plan Could Have Saved Lives in TX Plant Explosion

by ThinkReliability Staff

Investigations are still ongoing to determine details on what caused the April 17, 2013 explosion in West, Texas (the subject of a previous blog).  The death toll has risen to at least 14, including 10 emergency workers.  Around 200 are believed to be injured.  The deaths were caused by the explosion of the site AND the proximity of the victims to the site.  The emergency workers were on-site fighting a fire (which was the ignition source of the explosion), but many of those injured had no real reason to be in such a proximity that they would be injured.   

Warning systems and emergency notifications may have resulted in some of the non-emergency response victims getting out of harm’s way.  However, warning systems and notifications like those required for other industrial sites including oil refineries and chemical plants are not required at fertilizer plants.  The plant owner did not comment on emergency management plans for the site.  Senator Barbara Boxer of California will attempt to determine if those requirements need to be strengthened. 

However, even if a warning system had provided sufficient protection to keep nearby citizens from harm, the property damage would have been extensive.  Many properties – including homes and schools – nearby were severely damaged in the blast.  This has led some to believe that there should be an enforced geographical buffer between these types of industrial facilities and other types of facilities, like homes and schools.  The mayor of West has suggested that the plant be rebuilt away from populated areas. 

More and more concerns are being raised about the safety of the plant itself – and the safeguards that could have prevented this explosion.  Despite the large amount of potentially explosive ammonium nitrate stored at the plant, the plant did not have a sprinkler system or fire barrier (which may have prevented the fire from igniting the fertilizer).   

Industrial plants such as these are regulated by a host of state and federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA required a worst-case scenario from the West site, which identified a release from an anhydrous ammonia storage tank.  The risk of fire or explosion, and the storage of ammonium nitrate were not identified in the scenario, provided in 2011.  (The facility was fined in 2006 for not filing its risk management plan.) 

A key concern is the amount of fertilizer (270 tons) that was stored at the site – which was not disclosed with local governments or federal agencies.  Ammonium nitrate can be used as an explosive (~2.4 tons were used in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995).  The high volume of ammonium nitrate was not known or disclosed to local or federal officials.   

Most of the victims in this incident were first responders – who had reported to the fire, not knowing the risk they were taking.  The facility had not disclosed the dangers on site, had not provided adequate protection from fire, and had provided little in the way of an effective emergency response plan.   

Every industrial site should have an up-to-date risk/emergency management plan.  The plan needs to be updated whenever new hazards are brought on-site or identified.  It is crucial that these plans be developed and shared with local response organizations, such as fire-fighters, so that they can be prepared for any potential issues.  These plans should also include community engagement to provide necessary information to people in the area as to what actions should be taken.  Existing incident investigations for industrial incidents can be used as a basis for creating these plans.  But, you don’t need to wait until you have a problem at your facility.  Taking the lessons learned from disasters that have already taken place can save your facility – and your community – a tot of heartbreak.   

Remember: A smart man learns from his mistakes, but a wise man learns from others’ mistakes. 

Deadly Train Collision in Poland

By Kim Smiley

On March 4, 2012, two passenger trains collided head-on near Szczekociny, Poland killing 16 and injuring 58.  It was Poland’s deadliest train crash in 20 years.

An investigation is underway to determine what caused the deadly accident, but an initial Cause Map can be built now and more details can be added as information becomes available.  A Cause Map is a visual root cause analysis format.  The first step in the process is to determine which organizational goals were not met and in this example the obvious goal to focus on is the safety goal.

The safety goal wasn’t met because there were fatalities and injuries.  This occurred when two trains crashed because they were traveling on the same track in opposite directions.  It’s not clear exactly how the trains ended up on the same track, but it appears human error was involved since prosecutors have announced plans to charge a controller for unintentionally causing the accident.  Media reports have also stated that the routing mechanism for one of the trains was set incorrectly so that it was sent down the wrong track and into the path of the other train.  As with any investigation that leads to human error, more information will be needed about why the mistake was made in order to fully understand why the accident occurred and determine what would be needed to prevent a similar one in the future.  In this case, we can also assume that the accident was caused by inadequate oversight of the controller or lack of a double check of the mechanisms because an ideal system won’t allow one single mistake to result in a deadly accident.

Another fact worth considering is that the rail system in Poland is in the midst of a massive modernization effort.  Poland’s rail system is being modernized to prepare for the huge crowds expected to travel to the Euro 2012 soccer championship this July.  The modernization effort has been possible in part because of subsidies offered by the European Union, which Poland joined in 2004.  As part of the modernization, more connections have been added and more trains have been running on the track where the accident occurred.  It isn’t clear yet if any of the changes contributed to the accident, but any recent changes to a system are worth reviewing during an accident investigation.

As more information is found during the investigation, the causes can easily be incorporated into the Cause Map to capture as much detail as needed.  To view a high level Cause Map, click “download PDF” above.

1960 Plane Collision over NYC killed 134

By ThinkReliability Staff

On December 16, 1960, two planes collided about a mile above Brooklyn, New York.  One plane – United Airlines Flight 826 – was in a holding pattern preparing to descend into Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy International) Airport.  The other plane – TWA Flight 266 – was preparing to descend into LaGuardia.  Since both airports serve New York City, they are in fairly close proximity.  The planes, too, were in close proximity – too close, leading to their collision.  In addition to the 84 passengers killed on the United flight (though one would survive for a day) and the 44 passengers killed on the TWA flight, 6 people were killed in the neighborhood of Park Slope, where the United plane landed.

This incident can be outlined in a Cause Map or visual root cause analysis.  We begin with determining the impacted goals.  First, the 134 total deaths were an impact to the safety goal.  The United flight crash resulted in a fire that affected more than 200 buildings, an impact to both the environmental and property goal.   The liability for the crash was assigned to both airlines and the government, an impact to the customer service goal.  There was another impact to the property goal because both planes were destroyed.  Lastly, the labor goal was impacted due to the rescue efforts of the more than 2,500 personnel who responded to the two crash sites.

These impacts to the goals occurred when both planes crashed after colliding.  The planes collided after their flight paths brought them into too close of proximity.  The United flight was estimated to be 12 miles outside its holding  pattern when the crash occurred, possibly because the ground beacon was not working.  The controllers at Idlewild were unaware of the plane’s position as planes were not tracked in holding patterns as it was too difficult to identify individual planes.  The planes were unaware of each other.  The visibility was extremely poor due to foggy, cloudy, sleety and snowy weather.  The United plane had lost the ability to use their instruments due to a loss of a receiver.  (The cause is unknown.)  Additionally, the controllers at LaGuardia (who were guiding in the TWA flight) were unable to reach the TWA plane to warn them of the close proximity of the United plane.

Although comprehensive details are not known about the crash, much of the information used to put together the investigation was obtained from the flight recorder (or “black box”).  This is now a main source of data in aviation accident investigations.  The evidence in this case was used to divide up liability for the accident very exactly – 61% to United Airlines, 24% to the US government and the remainder to TWA.

To view the Outline and Cause Map, please click “Download PDF” above.

Train Crash in China Kills 39

By Kim Smiley

It is rare for the conduct of the investigation to be one of the biggest headlines in the week following an accident, but this has been the case after a recent train crash in China.  On July 23, 2011, two trains collided in Wenzhou, China, killing 39 and sending another 192 people to the hospital.

What appears to have happened is that a train moving at speed rear ended another train that had stalled on the tracks. It was announced that the first train had stalled after a lightning strike.  Soon after the accident, people reported seeing the damaged train cars broken apart by back hoes and buried.  Meaning the evidence was literally being buried without ever having been thoroughly examined.  The Chinese government stated that the cars contained “State-level” technology and were being buried to keep it safe.

The internet frenzy and public outrage fueled by how this investigation was handled was impressive. According to a recent New York Times article, 26 million messages about the tragedy have been posted on China’s popular twitter-like microblogs.  So powerful has the public outrage been that the first car from the oncoming train has been dug up and sent to Wenzhou for analysis.

More information  on the technical reasons for the train crash is slowly coming to light.  Five days after the accident, government officials have stated that a signal which would have stopped the moving train failed to turn red and the error wasn’t noticed by workers.  There is talk about system design errors and inadequate training.

It’s unlikely that all the details will ever be public knowledge, but there is one takeaway from this accident that can be applied to any organization in any industry that performs investigations – the importance of transparency. The Chinese government spent over $100 billion in 2010 expanding the high speed rail system, but if people don’t feel safe riding the rail system it won’t be money well spent.  Customers need to feel that an adequate investigation has been performed following an accident or they won’t use the products produced by the company.

To view an initial Cause Map built for this train accident, please click on “Download PDF” above.  A Cause Map is an intuitive, visual method of performing a root cause analysis.  One of the benefits of a Cause Map is that it’s easily understood and can help improve the transparency of an investigation for all involved.

Two Killed in Barge/Tour Boat Collision

By ThinkReliability Staff

On July 7, 2010, a barge being propelled by a tug boat collided with a tour boat that had dropped anchor in the Delaware River.  As a result of the collision, two passengers on the tour boat were killed and twenty-six were injured.  The tour boat sank in 55 feet of water.

Detail regarding the incident has just been released in an updated NTSB report.  We can use the information about this report to begin a Cause Map, or visual root cause analysis.  The information in the report can also point us in the direction of important questions that remain to be answered to determine exactly what happened and, most importantly, how incidents like these can be prevented in the future.

In this case, a tour boat had dropped anchor to deal with mechanical problems.  According to the tour boat crew’s testimony and radio recordings, the tour boat crew attempted to get in touch with the tug boat by yelling and making radio calls.  Neither were answered or apparently noticed.  The barge that was being propelled by the tug boat crashed into the tour boat, resulting in deaths, injuries and loss of the tour boat.

The lookout on the tug boat was inadequate (had it been adequate, the tug boat would have noticed the tour boat in time to avoid the collision).  The report has determined that the tug boat master was off-duty and below-deck at the time of the collision.  According to cell phone records, the mate who was on lookout duty was on a phone call at the time of the collision and had made several phone calls during his duty. The inadequate lookout combined with the inability of the tour boat to make contact with the tug boat resulted in the collision.

There are two obvious areas where more detail is needed in the Cause Map to determine what was going on that led to the issues on the tug boat.  Specifically, why was the lookout on the cell phone and why wasn’t the tour boat able to contact the tug boat through the radio?  Because of the strict requirements for lookouts on marine duty, there is also an ongoing criminal investigation into the lookout’s actions.  When the final NTSB report is issued, and the criminal case is closed, these questions should be answered.  More detail can be added to this Cause Map as the analysis continues. As with any investigation the level of detail in the analysis is based on the impact of the incident on the organization’s overall goals.